The first lecture in the series “Cultural Policy and the Idea of the University” delivered by Uladzimir Matskevich at a seminar in the autumn of 2009, which marked the beginning of the Flying University programme. This text is an edited transcript of the lectures.
Translated from: Vladimir Matskevich, Pavel Barkovsky. Universitet: Diskussiya ob osnovaniyakh [The University: Foundations Debate]. Ed. T. Vodolazhskaya. Minsk: I.P. Logvinov, 2011, 160.
The goal of this series of lectures is to present the idea of the University, which leads to the establishment of the modern university in Belarus within a cultural policy programme. Aspects and fragments of this idea are scattered in various texts, but so far have not been gathered into a coherent entity. In this series of lectures, I will try to outline some openings in which the idea of the university needs to be spelt out before its implementation. I see at least four such major openings today: the university as a thought mega-machine; as a factor or instrument of nation-building; as a place for the formation of project and programme elites; and, finally, as an educational institution.
Today, within the topic “Historical forms of thinking and the actualization of modern forms of thinking at the university”, I will try to connect the idea of the university with the historical development of methodology and, in particular, with its modern stage of development – the cultural policy stage.
I will not elaborate on and argue for the fundamentals of the System Conscious Activity (SCA) Methodology – particularly, the fact that thinking is a collective activity – or justify the idea of the communicative nature of thinking. I will just keep to the statement that underlies all my further arguments: thinking is possible only as something collective.
Thinking has always been collective and has always been fulfilled collectively. At the same time, it has always been fulfilled in small groups, narrowly, in various clubs where people are in direct contact with one another. These clubs create languages, jargon, and rules which are accepted by default (i.e., they are not always reflected on or retrievable to an external observer). The cultivation of thinking in groups of direct communication has always faced an obstacle: it has been difficult for outsiders to join these groups precisely because of their esoteric languages, categories, rules, and norms. At the time of its emergence and during its long period of formation, the Moscow Methodological Circle (MMC), of which I am a member and follower, existed as a small group or as a close circle of people who knew each other personally. However, even then, the questions of who is engaged in thinking or what is the minimal unit for thinking was raised in this circle in one way or another.
The MMC recognized the collective nature of thinking and rejected the individual, the person as a subject of thinking. The question “Who thinks?” referred to a certain group of people, which they wanted to structure, to understand how it could be organized. That is why, along with the concepts of verbal thinking and the communicative nature of thinking, the concept of populative thinking was used. At the same time, the very nature of a thinking group was described in everyday, metaphorical terms or historical anecdotes, tracing the club as a subject of thinking back to different historical forms: academies (Plato’s academy) or clubs that existed around certain leaders of Socratic schools. Reflecting on this, the MMC concluded that thinking is possible in clubs that somehow reflect or identify themselves, for instance, as insidious colleges; or, as it was during the formation of the new European science, as the “Republic of Scholars”, when several dozen people were in constant and quite intensive (at the time) correspondence with each other. This circle of people who were in direct contact with one another was cemented, or held together, by various means: everyone read the same books, referred to those books by commenting and criticizing, and everyone was familiar with the criticism and commentaries. It created a certain content field where these people mingled, adhering in one way or another to default norms and languages with a large set of presuppositions that were not known and not understood by others, by outsiders. These clubs, or groups, acted as the main historical social form of thinking.
However, following the reports on attributive knowledge and defining methodology development as a research programme on thinking as an activity, the Moscow Methodological Circle brought up an issue of narrow-order expansion or a passage to a wider order. First, the questions of communication between thinking groups were raised. By that time, it had become commonplace to argue that science specialization leads to difficulty in communication between representatives of different disciplines and to further isolation of disciplinary, subject-oriented groups, which is the exact opposite of universality claims of thinking. Specialization draws us away from universality, and, therefore, the established forms of institutionalization of intellectual activity – universities, scientific journals, and academies – can no longer claim to be holders of thought, and not even to be the environment where such holders can exist. Communication acceleration – the emergence of telephones, telefaxes, and later the means for very rapid copying and distribution of texts (long before the Internet era) – has led these specialized groups of scholars who no more needed live communication to increasingly switch to indirect communication. Decades-old forms of communication, such as scientific journals, have become very accessible as items (journal as a thing), but as forms of communication, they have become a means of “shutting off” these groups of scientists.
Perhaps, I should not dwell on this in such detail since it is already clear. I will just note that in the early 1960s, the MMC brought up the issue of thinking technologies. Initially, it was posed in precisely such a technocratic way. At this time (the late 1950s – early 1960s), cybernetics and systems theory were being legitimized in the Soviet Union, and everyone began to massively read, if not Bertalanffy and Mesarovic, then at least various “accounts” of what had been accumulated in cybernetics and the systems approach for a mass intellectual and scientific reader. That is why the enthusiasm for technologization and cybernetics was rather great, and the initial focus of the MMC on technologization of thinking did not go far beyond this technical analogy.
However, it quickly became clear that technology is much broader than what is narrowly understood as technique. Technology implies a whole range of humanitarian aspects, such as communication, organizing people, including people as holders of certain values, know-how, and skills. By the end of the 1960s, the humanitarian aspects of technologization began to be analyzed. In this sense, today one can understand the MMC claim to technologization of thinking as an attempt to break the narrow approach to thinking subjects (thinking collectives) and enter into communication with other thinking collectives; to establish a sphere of thinking that would not imply the narrow formats of direct acquaintance and development of their own argots and jargons, sets of presuppositions and customary law that emerges in these groups, or customs and traditions set based on unspoken norms of interaction.
The first and only activity which helped the MMC to expand beyond the narrow club was the organizational-activity game (OAG).
Even though 30 years have passed since this method emerged and a great amount of time and work has been devoted to its study, description, and reflection by all the MMC followers, not all OAG aspects that could be of active interest have been described and presented. What is important to me now is the following: OAG was the method that enabled the involvement of outsiders, who had not “lived” in the MMC for many years, in organized thinking. In this sense, OAG allowed to circumvent the limitations, the obstacles caused by gobbledygook, i.e., the jargon of closed clubs, and allowed to bring almost randomly assembled people into thinking mode with a very limited set of schemes. The enthusiasm for games lasted for almost 10 years until the change in sociocultural conditions – perestroika, the breakup of indrawn Soviet forms of life, the introduction of market and democracy to Soviet reality, access to information, the emergence of new ideas from the West, etc. – led to the degeneration of OAG in the early 1990s. From that time on, they ceased to be a form of organization of collective thinking and became a form of pumping up, motivating, and inspiring people for a certain active transformation. The disappearance of thinking from the “games for perestroika” led to the method’s emasculation.
Nevertheless, we remember the first period of games which were a form of organization of thinking. Therefore, when methodology begins to reflect on its own crisis and the need to transition to a new stage, which we call “cultural policy” here in Minsk, in fact, as holders of thinking, we have two objects: a narrow club organized around a seminar (with a corresponding organization of life) and OAG.
At the stage of methodology transition from a club to a community of wider order, it became clear that these two forms – a methodological seminar and OAG – could not meet the requirements of the new stage in the development of methodology. That is when methodologists start to probe for European forms of organization of thinking.
Much was born from these reflections, but what’s important for me now and relevant to the university presentations, is the idea of “generations of universities” suggested by Piotr Shchedrovitsky that considers the new free universities under creation as the last stage (5th generation universities) of the university evolution in Europe. And following the MMC claim, we declare ourselves the next stage.
Now I need to give a historical overview and outline some important stages of university formation. But before that, I will summarize what I have said. To sum up, during the crisis of methodology we end up with two forms of organization of thinking, these are 1) narrow clubs and 2) OAG and OAG-like forms that we find in other spheres of activity. To these two forms, I must add two more – ideal – forms, and further I will speak of them as such; these are 3) political parties, or clubs, and 4) the university.
Thus, we have two organized (specially created) forms, which can be “felt” and found in this world, and two ideal forms – the university and political parties, or clubs – which in reality rarely turn into carriers of thought, but as forms of organization, they must be conceived in this way.
I am not going to talk about parties now. I simply need to mention them here. I will talk about the university as an ideal form first. Later, I will have to get to organizational forms: how they are created and what they might look like in reality.
The next rather categorical point, which I present without much argumentation at the moment (it will be possible to return to it later in a different mode), is as follows. Currently, the forms of scientific organization of activity (research institutes and, of greater concern to me, universities) are degrading. To date, universities have ceased to be thinking collective organizations in and of themselves and have ceased to create an environment for the existence of such thinking forms.
However, such a situation has already been observed in history. After almost 500 years of the existence of universities, when new European science was being found, universities ceased to be thinking entities, they lost their claim to universality. It took almost 200 years to reorganize and restructure universities until they again became leading institutions both for intellectual and activity development.
Further, I have a few narrative theses or openings. The first one concerns the claim to universality.
Universities in Europe are thought to have originated in Northern Italy, in Bologna and Padua. Historians who view Eurocentrism as evil have proposed the version that the first universities emerged in the Arab world after all. The Moroccan cities of Fez and Marrakech allegedly had universities sometime before Bologna and Padua. But neither Fez, nor Marrakech, nor Bologna, nor Padua interest me, by and large, in terms of describing the ideal university.
When considering the university as one of the ideal forms in which thinking is possible, I would link the “beginning” of the university with the University of Paris. It gave impetus to the kind of university organization which can serve as a historical prototype of an ideal university with a claim to universality. In the period of scholasticism and refined scholastic thinking, the idea of universality (at least the universality of knowledge) seemed easily acceptable. Therefore, applying the simplest idea of gathering the universe of knowledge under one roof seemed quite realistic.
How does the gathering of knowledge holders with a claim to universality under the roof of the University of Paris differ from Padua or any of the preceding universities, including Oxford and Cambridge? To understand that, one must admit that a university with a claim to universality has nothing to do with education or even teaching. The ideal university is not an educational process but a gathering of the universe of knowledge in one place.
What is the universe of knowledge? It is important to gather people – people who know, understand, and think. In fact, at that time they were all scattered in monasteries, proto-universities, schools, etc. There had to be a critical place where they all could be gathered. In the small philistine Bologna, it was impossible to collect them – there was simply no critical mass there. But besides people, there are also books – again, mostly held in monastic libraries. They were quite common at that time but scattered all over Europe. A critical space was needed for a library claiming to be universal. It was quite difficult to compile a library in those times – the 12th-13th centuries – it is still a long way to go to the “Gutenberg galaxy”.
In addition to this, it is still necessary to create exceptional social and material conditions. In general, organizing such a “gathering” of people and books – not only for the Middle Ages but also for the modern world – is quite a big deal, it requires a lot of money and effort. Besides, it all needs to be transmitted. It is not a warehouse, not a treasury, but something alive.
So, inspired by such historical – or rather mythical – precedents as, for example, the Great Library of Alexandria, Plato’s Academy, and the “School of Athens”, people could imagine the idea of gathering the universe of knowledge in one place. There was no idea of Kuhn’s scientific revolutions back then, so one could think that knowledge accumulates, but not indefinitely, and therefore could be gathered in one place.
And the university with a claim to universality is a collection of the four “sums” below (Figure 1a).
Again, it is not just a treasure collection; it has to be somehow organized: to live and be stored. Even back then, people understood that certain conditions had to be created for books, although books were made of parchment and had been stored for centuries, it was still necessary to create a microclimate and other things for them as well. And what about mortal people?
For them, it was necessary to start the transmission process. “Education” (I put it in quotation marks so as not to define it as a concept prematurely) was just a kind of organizational enrichment to this collection. Books need to be read.
Actually, the idea that books need to be read is non-trivial. If you remember monk Jorge from The Name of the Rose, you will understand that the idea of the self-sufficiency of the book as a thing was even present in medieval Europe, not to mention that in the Arab East, the Quran fell from heaven as a thing, and therefore it is pre-created as God himself. So, the idea that one could and should not only collect books but also create the infrastructure of reading was quite innovative. “Education” itself is not necessarily training and teaching, but simply a superstructure for books to be read. Teaching is also needed to continually renew the group of people who will read these books and to reproduce the life norms under which such a useless in practical medieval life activity as reading will be reproduced.
The challenge and problem were that reading books was redundant. Medieval people understood why they needed to pray, people in Bologna and Padua understood why keep accounts and notarize contracts, but why read books? For them, it was bliss and luxury. Therefore, people who would read books had to be reproduced on purpose, in vitro. The social and material conditions for the lives of people who would read books had to be reproduced, too. So initially universities required a statutory organization, or institutionalization, akin to monasteries, which virtually regulated the entire life of a person – when to pray, when to plough the land, and when to read.
The second narrative thesis, or opening, refers to the organization of life in which the ideal of universality can be fulfilled in a limited space and continue in time. There is a rather subtle point here. The university is only possible when people live in a closed space – not a narrowly understood club, but in a secluded space – both throughout the day and throughout life. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the organization of people’s working days at the university and career, or organization of life (Figure 1b).
Ideally, people come to university having been born somewhere outside of it. And some are born at the university, or come and stay there forever, and pass away at the university. Then what does a day look like for someone living at the university? What does a professor’s typical day look like? They come, say, in the morning, give a lecture to dummy freshmen, and explain something important, sublime, pure, bright. Then they act as an academic advisor (again, for the Middle Ages this is not exactly true, but still) when students are writing some paper (term paper, thesis, PhD thesis, etc.). Later during this working day (though not every day), they attend the defence of, say, a student’s thesis or term paper, diploma, or PhD thesis, etc., where criticism, doubt, and other attributes of thinking are needed. After that, they might attend a philosophical or scientific debate. And there, having defended three times and having survived criticism, they find themselves in a situation where people equal to them in status, in training, in self-perception are discussing some issues and where there are no authorities, titles, regalia and statuses. After that they invite some of the students they like to have dinner with their nubile daughter, and over a family dinner, they discuss how the life of a real university professor should be organized, if this dolt wants to become one, taking their daughter as his wife, etc. Moreover, there are some holidays and corporate events. One of my favourite anecdotes is about caroling students who burst into Professor Cuvier’s bedroom and try to scare him, while he, rubbing his eyes, tells a student who is hovering over him wearing fell and horns, “You won’t eat me, because you have horns”. As a zoologist, even not fully awake, he cannot mix up carnivore and herbivore. This anecdote is about the rootedness of subject knowledge, but what matters to me now is the fact that caroling students can break into a professor’s bedroom. Can you imagine caroling students at BSU in Minsk? I am not talking about them being able to break through the cordon of intercom, wife, etc. For this to be possible, students and professors must live close to each other.
So, the working day plus free time of a person who is part of a university corporation flows from one situation of thinking to another. Therefore, thanks to the university, thinking becomes virtually continuous. A person changes roles, or positions, in collective-distributed thinking several times during a workday. As they change them, they do not identify with any of the positions necessary for collective thinking. A position becomes detached from the person, and their life proceeds in situations from thinking to thinking in different positions and situations.
Besides, to understand what happens to a person at the university, one must look at the career, or the course of life. Upon entering a university, a person becomes a student, and they develop an initial attitude to the universe of knowledge – they begin to master it. Later, when they find themselves a graduate, a “defendant” (when they write their doctoral thesis, for example), they move into a different category, becoming a person who is obliged to get knowledge. While obtaining knowledge, they find themselves in a complex collective positional relationship, in which they have to both “obtain” knowledge and defend it. When they have defended it, they find themselves in a situation of knowledge transmission. They get this right because they have obtained some additional knowledge, defended it, and now they transmit it. Moreover, they become guardians of this knowledge, participating in various defence councils, being opponents, participating in philosophical disputes, etc. Throughout their life, they add to their career, their biography several different stages of attitude toward the knowledge obtained by mankind. Besides, all these positions are simultaneously present during the day at the university, because people meet there daily: students, young scientists who grope for knowledge (and in this sense, still uncritical of it all), sceptical scientists, professors in their mature years, and good-natured old people who are rather engaged in moulding. All this happens in the same space at the same time, all of it overlaps on different stages of one person’s life, and all the life stages intertwine daily in different situations of interaction and communication. It is not to mention university professors’ children who grow up in this environment and are drawn into all these processes from childhood.
The next narrative thesis is that idealism, or non-utilitarianism, is very important in the ideal university (Figure 1c).
Regardless of whether metaphysicians are right in admitting or rejecting the existence of a universe of knowledge, knowledge, its protection, thinking, etc. must be values in themselves, be cared for and served. There should be no other practical function for the servants of knowledge and thought. Who did the medieval universities – the ones we regard as “ideal” – train?
They trained people capable of living at universities. Universities were reproduced. The university did not prepare anyone for any practical activity.
Why do I start analyzing the history of universities with the University of Paris and not, for example, the one in Bologna? From its beginning, the University of Bologna trained notaries, clerks, and lawyers for practical needs, while the University of Paris, the centre of scholasticism, was not designed to train anyone at all. It was much later that this function was ascribed to it. But it happened after a certain crisis when idealism and non-utilitarianism reached their limits and passed the point of absurdity.
A new stage in university life is associated with a turn to the “New Organon”, to Galilean science, to a different formation of thinking, when logic and rationalistic forms of proof ceased to be the prevailing criteria of truth. Universities failed to assimilate emerging new knowledge, a new approach tradition in Europe. Thus, most people applying new approaches could not exist at universities. The university environment, the ideal university was meant to reproduce itself, the same people who live there, and could not incorporate the innovations in European thinking and European science. For almost two centuries, science existed separately from universities. The latter reproduced scholasticism.
In some parts of the world, for example, in Belarus, this lasted for another two centuries. Not only that the first universities in Belarus were established, in fact, on the eve of that transition to the new-age, new-European type of thinking, but life was also paralyzed in those provincial universities. When one enthusiastically finds philosophical manuscripts containing scholastic disputes and scholastic sophistication from Hrodna (although far from the level of Doctor Subtilis), one should understand that the Belarusians did it in the 18th century when the rest of Europe was already occupied with other problems.
In general, universities could continue engaging in such developments if not for some historical conditions and circumstances. I will not talk about them in detail now – it will suffice to name a few German universities that were located in small towns. The described above conditions for organizing life at an ideal university cannot be created in a big city. Therefore, universities that continued to maintain that lifestyle, were usually moved elsewhere. In the Modern Age, German universities in small towns were more like “ideal” universities. Besides, they could not but be incorporated into social practice. In towns and small monarchy-states of fragmented Germany, university corporations could constitute a significant percentage of the population. Therefore, while a large state could recruit diplomats from the aristocracy, small German principalities were forced to enroll the university fraternity for political purposes. The connection between small German universities and the social practices of the states which patronized them was, therefore, closer and more practical. The German universities of the 17th and 18th centuries were in this sense better candidates for the ideal university than were the old university in Paris or the metropolitan universities of big states, even though some metropolitan universities – in Stockholm, for example – were also organized in a secluded way for some time. In the 17th century, while organizing Protestant forms of life, the Americans began to create universities from schools for training pastors and intentionally built them in secluded spaces – campuses. This is why the most famous American universities still exist separately, remotely, where all the necessary forms of life can be set up and organized.
In this sense, German universities were connected to social practice, and their professors could be in contact with scientists involved in the real knowledge expansion or criticism, experiments, and theorizing. They were the first to incorporate the new science and therefore the first to overcome this crisis. Thinking, after a certain period of scholastic self-reproduction of universities, returned to universities.
Here we would again have to deal with history in some detail, but what matters to me now is the figure of Christian Wolff who did a very strange thing when he became the Rector of the University of Halle. He tried (unlike other rectors who were more concerned with diplomatic, organizational, and economic matters) to organize the transmission of the universal knowledge at the university. Christian Wolff can be credited with the methodological organization of scientific thinking courses into the academic curriculum. On the one hand, it gave an impetus to the development of universities and their transformation into what the Humboldt University became later, and on the other hand, it gave a powerful impetus to the development of sciences. The sciences began as the narrow club, the “Republic of Scholars,” and through the university organization of life became a technologized activity of large – as much as eighteenth-century Europe needed it – groups of people.
I might have missed something essential in this presentation, but, in general, the ideal university can be tracked in its historical development to the time of Wolff and Humboldt. From that point, different life at the university begins. It is from then on that we can begin to count down the restructuring of the basic activity functions of the university. A completely different thing happens to the universities: education becomes their dominant function, universities are increasingly seen as providing education, as educational institutions; people start being sent to universities. They do not go there on their own, they do not come there for some reason, like people go to monasteries. Children are sent there for education. This has happened before, but it is becoming a mass practice. It is the organization of educational processes that begins to restructure everything else about the university. Since the university starts providing education, education begins to be valued outside of universities, which was not the case in mass practice before. Education becomes non-universal.
Sometimes the rejection of universality is linked to the development of knowledge, the selection of sciences, etc. But this is not the point; the point is that as soon as education becomes a value, this value always has its own limits, and these limits completely contradict universality – it becomes not just impossible, but unfashionable, disreputable and wrong to be universally educated, universally knowledgeable. The function of thinking, too, is being alienated from the university. Considering all criticism of scholastic thinking – which I can also partially join – before Wolff and Humboldt, universities were an environment that organized thinking – it was technologized there through the normalization of lifestyle. As soon as education becomes the main, dominant function, the university itself must be organized and maintained so that thinking does not completely disappear from there. Unfortunately, most universities have lost their thinking in this situation, but some have managed to maintain it through the preservation of clubs and small groups.
Thus, there was a shift from a rationalist to an empiricist attitude at universities. Empiricism and inductive thinking became organic to universities themselves. Once it happened, the thinking part of university folks stopped caring about universities as such: universities were given under the control of others – the non-thinkers.
To sum up, I have outlined the idea of the university which suits me fine. In this historical outline, what is essential to me is the historical precedent of the medieval scholastic university, which was a form of organization of thinking in a wider order. For me, the idea of universality, or Universum, is “ideological” in this case. What is an ideological idea? In this case, it means that it is an idea that motivates some people to collective action. When this motivation has become a fact and people are already acting, this idea can be discarded – it becomes unnecessary. This is how metal castings are made based on puncheons moulded from clay: metal is poured and fills in the gap between two layers of clay, and then the clay is no longer needed. It was like a materialized form that was used to shape something else. So is the idea of universality for me in this case.
Using this as a kind of prototype, we need to further understand the assembly scheme of the university as a mega-machine of thinking, or as a form of organization of thinking in a wider order, on new material and in a new situation. Because when we talk about technology, we need to deal with tradition, to remove from tradition everything necessary to organize artificial technical action.
The new situation is a situation of crisis, the departure of thinking from universities. I do not know when this crisis began, but its very existence has been recorded, and for some time now, attempts have been made to comprehend and overcome it. The Bologna Process is sometimes seen as an attempt to solve this crisis, but with all its strengths and weaknesses, it is nothing more than an opportunity to take mass higher education quite technologically and seriously. The university I am talking about is not a mass university. It is only possible based on a normal higher education that has been neglected and that is currently being developed, with many obstacles and setbacks, within the Bologna Process, Copenhagen Process, and so on. But its organization requires fundamentally different approaches and foundations.
 V.V. Matskevich. “Belarus vopreki ochevidnosti”. Vopreki ochevidnosti [Belarus contrary to the obvious. Contrary to the Obvious]. Nevsky prostor, 2006.
 See, for example: Matskevich V.V. Myshlenie; Mysledeyatelnost; SMD-metodologiya. Noveyshy filosofsky slovar [Thinking; Mental Activity; SCA Methodology. Contemporary Dictionary of Philosophy]. Compiled by A.A. Gritsanov. Minsk, 1998. Pp. 447, 449, 624.
 Populative – characteristic of a “popule”, a cogitative construct, a unit of entirety. Term introduced by Georgy Shchedrovitsky. – Trans. note.
 See Shchedrovitsky G.P., Alekseev N.G. O vozmozhnykh putyakh issledovaniya myshleniya kak deyatelnosti [On possible ways to study thinking as an activity] // Reports of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the RSFSR (3), 1957. Pp. 41-46; Shchedrovitsky G.P. O stroenii atributivnogo znaniya. Soobschenie I. Stroyenie spetsificheski myslennogo nominativnogo znaniya [On the structure of attributive knowledge. Presentation I. The structure of nuanced mental nominative knowledge] // Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the RSFSR (1), 1958. Pp. 63-66 and others.
 Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy, biologist, founder of the general systems theory; Mihajlo Mesarovic, one of the authors of the popular in the 70s books General Systems Theory: Mathematical Foundations and Theory of Hierarchical, Multilevel, Systems.
 On the history and periodisation of OAG, see Egorov A., Vodolazhskaya T. Organizatsionno-deyatelnostnye igry. Popularnoye vvedenie [Organisational-Activity Games. A Popular Introduction]. Minsk, 2007; Matskevich V.V. SMD-podkhod v kulturnoy politike, ili kulturnaya politika v metapodkhode [SCA approach in cultural policy, or cultural policy in a meta-approach]. http://worvik.com/method/avksentev.htm
 In 1215, the University of Paris, Europe’s first secular university, was founded following the merging of ecclesiastical schools. It featured four faculties: art, canon law, theology, and medicine.
 Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 1962.
 The scholastic accolade of Duns Scotus, Latin: Doctor Subtilis – Ed. note.